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One purpose of this note is to reply to Manfred
Bienefeld's critique. Another and more interesting
objective is to generate from the discussion a list of
topics for further investigation. Regrettably, this reply
to Bienefeld's critique must be hurried and tentative
- hurried because I postponed writing it while
awaiting his final draft; tentative because the final
draft failed to appear in time for me to employ it. I am
therefore reacting to notes which he prepared for his
lecture, trusting that his final position will not change
significantly from the time of his presentation.
Counter-arguments
Bienefeld's basic position would appear to contain
three major points:
j) The basic parameters for Africa's development
are set by international market conditions.
Domestic policy choices are relatively
unimportant in consequence.
Prices - certainly international prices - provide
a misleading guide to allocational decisions.
Governments should therefore seek to alter the
allocations which would result from the use of
(international) market prices.
It is impossible to reply at length to these points.
Instead I shall touch upon them only insofar as they
provide the grounds for Bienefeld's criticism of my
work. Moreover, given the limitations on my time, I
shall have to debate them in a light and I fear,
somewhat, unscholarly manner, foreswearing the
usual impedimenta of scholarly controversy:
references, citations, supporting evidence, and such.
My strategy will be to take points i) and ii) singly.
Point iii) will be attacked by undermining the first two,
from which it is deduced.
Are Parameters Set by the World Market?
In discussing my work, Bienefeld repeatedly stresses
that the contemporary condition of African economies
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demonstrates the determining influence of inter-
national economic conditions upon their economic
performance. lam held to be 'writing in the 1980s' and
I should therefore have known better than to place
primary stress on the policy choices of African
governments.
Although read by Bienefeld in the 1980s, I was in fact
writing in the 1970s. While the oil price rise of the
1970s hurt many African nations, it favoured others;
the oil exporting nations comprised approximately
one quarter of sub-Saharan Africa's population. The
oil-importing nations experienced commodity booms
of their own. I refer to price movements in the market
for coffee which, next to oil, is the most valuable
commodity exchanged in international markets.
There were, of course, grievous problems in
international trade in the 1970s. But they were simply
not of the same magnitude as those witnessed at
present.
My major point, however, is that I feel it unwise to
insist, as Bienefeld does, on the distinction between
politics (especially domestic politics) and markets
(specifically, international markets). The division
disguises the degree to which there is a political
dimension to the way in which Third World nations
incorporate themselves into international markets.
Not all nations employ the same strategy; a given
nation, over time, may employ a variety of strategies.
There is a range of discretion and choice about the way
in which domestic political economies can be coupled
to international markets. And understanding what
determines the policy choices which lead to different
forms of incorporation represents an important
section ofthe research frontier in development studies.
An appropriate illustration is furnished by the
International Coffee Agreement, which places quantity
constraints on coffee exports in an effort to secure
higher international prices. Some nations adjust to
these constraints by over-valuing their currencies. One
result, at current world prices, is the reduction of
exports; another is the redistribution of economic
opportunities from exporters to importers. Other
nations adjust by limiting production; this measure
favours established producers and penalises new
entrants. Other nations adjust by taxing exports; still
others by purchasing all that is produced while
limiting exports by accumulating inventories. These
measures represent contrasting transfers between
producers and the fisc. Confronted with a single
stimulus originating from the international market-
place, then, governments assign the costs of
adjustment to different domestic groupings. These
contrasting policies represent a variety of political
accommodations to the international market.
The point is that rigidly distinguishing between
international markets and domestic politics is
relatively uninformative. A range of choices exists and
the particular strategy chosen determines the
magnitude and distribution of the costs of adjustment.
This realisation encourages as well the adoption of a
perspective which focuses on the relative merits of
different strategies. Given that governments can make
policy choices but cannot control international
markets, it focuses attention on issues which can be
determined by action. In this sense, pace Bienefeld, the
approach may in fact be more oriented toward 'the
real world'.
It may be useful to point out as well that the distinction
between domestic politics and international markets
lacks utility when applied to that portion of the market
which is external to the African economies. One need
but observe the impact of the domestic policies of the
United States upon international market prices, both
for commodities and capital. The stockpiling of
strategic materials in the 1950s drove up commodity
prices; so too did the decision to finance the Vietnam
war without cutting back domestic spending. The
impact of domestic politics is further illustrated by the
current budgetary crisis, which has driven up interest
rates in international capital markets, with grievous
implications for the financing of Third World debt.
Were Bienefeld to counter by arguing that the United
States is so sheltered from world market forces as to
discredit an approach that requires that it be analysed
in the same terms as the dependent political economies
of Africa, I would then invite him to talk with those
who have lost their jobs as a consequence of the
decisions taken by their 'policy makers' - job losses
which resulted from the impact of fiscal deficits on the
competitiveness of export industries. I would also
invite him to analyse the impact of the necessity to
maintain international competitiveness upon the
domestic political sustainability of social welfare
programmes in advanced industrial nations. It is
arguable that social democracy in the developed world
is yet another victim of the mobility of economic
resources in international market environments.
Prices: A Good Guide to Decisions?
Point ii): I employed pricing data to analyse politics.
'Market' prices provided a benchmark. I attempted to
use them to determine what would have prevailed in
the absence of government market intervention, and
then to infer whose interests prevailed in the attempts
by interests to manipulate pricing policies. I attempted
not only to analyse the way in which market
interventions are employed for political purposes, but
also the manner in which they generate political
resources - resources which would be used to
organise.
In using 'market' prices as a methodological reference
point, I made no commitment to them as being
inherently more moral or just. I do in fact feel that
given the distribution of income in most African
societies in the 1970s, market prices were to be
preferred to those which governments sought to
implement. But that does not imply a generalised
commitment to the market as an allocational
institution.
Insofar as Bienefeld infers such a generalised
commitment, then, he is mistaking my methodological
position for an ethical commitment. But Bienefeld
goes beyond ethics to considerations of efficiency. He
makes the point that market signals - i.e. prices -
often provide information which is misleading, in the
sense that it leads to an inefficient allocation of
resources. This is particularly the case, he argues, with
dynamic allocational programmes, given the level of
uncertainty inherent in intertemporal choice. The
inference he draws is that governments should
override the market for purposes of 'long-run
efficiency'.
A basic problem with Bienefeld's argument is that it is
insufficiently elaborated. Capital markets - the
markets in which intertemporal allocations are
secured - could be inefficient because they are non-
competitive. A proper response would then be the
encouragement of more private sector lending rather
than less, as by relaxing barriers to entry. Or capital
markets may be inefficient because they are
incomplete; public guarantees for new forms of
contracts (or contingent claims) could then be the
remedy - contracts which are then tradeable in
private markets. The point is that to go from the
existence of market failure to the prescription of the
remedy of government investment is to make far too
grand a leap.
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There is a second major portion of Bienefeld's
discussion of efficiency - a portion which directly
addresses the subject of my work, which was African
agriculture. Governments, Bienefeld argues, tax
agriculture in order to induce development, and that is
a basic reason for their pricing policies. The departure
of official prices from market prices is therefore in
keeping with the 'transformational' (my word, not
Bienefeld's) role of government and the goal of 'long
term efficiency' (Bienefeld's word, not mine). This
conclusion is reached by noting that taxes constitute a
major source of price distortions in export agriculture;
that agriculture constitutes a major portion of the tax
base and agricultural exports generate a major portion
of the foreign exchange earnings in most African
countries; and that governments need revenues and
foreign exchange in order to invest in development
projects.
It is important to realise that Bienefeld's conclusion
about governmental pricing policies does not follow
from the initial conditions. Quite simply, there are
ways of taxing agriculture other than by taxing the
commodities produced by farmers: income taxes, sales
taxes, or land taxes, for example. The significance of
these alternatives is that were they used, they would
induce a governmental preference for higher agri-
cultural prices; higher prices would result in higher
profits for farms and therefore greater revenue
collections from the incomes or consumption
purchases of farm families or from the increased value
of their land. The 'low price' policies of African
governments thus do not inevitably result from their
need for taxes; rather, they may result from the specific
nature of the fiscal instruments at their command.
Not only are there many ways to tax. There are also
many ways of moving resources out of agriculture
- which many take to be the hallmark of
'development' - other than by taxing it. Increased
farm productivity, given inelastic demand, would lead
to a shift of land, labour, or capital from farming, all
else being constant. The 'Mills/Marshall treadmill'
has lead to the structural transformation of economies
elsewhere in the world. An important part of
Bienefeld's position, then, is not elaborated. It has to
do with why he would find it preferable to secure the
'great transformation' through the fiscal system of the
state rather than through market competition.
A likely possibility, of course, is that Bienefeld would
find the social costs of this alternative too great, the
major such cost being the magnitude and kind of the
resultant inequality. But then many find the social
costs of the state-led alternative high, given the kind
and magnitude of inequality which it produces. The
major point is that debates concerning equality are not
likely to resolve the controversy concerning the two
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transformational strategies, for in terms of their
impact on equality, there may be little to choose
between them.
Let us assume that Bienefeld meets all of these
objections. That is, let us assume that we have in fact
conceded that market systems are inefficient and
socially undesirable; that they promote decisions
which lead to insufficient investment; and that
governments must therefore provide the primary
source of investment and secure resources from
agriculture. The question then arises: Why, under
these circumstances, would one feel that the
government would do a particularly good job of
investing? Are public employees smarter? Certainly
my abilities do not rise when I draw my pay from a
development agency rather than from my university;
nor do I find those for whom I consult to be smarter
than my colleagues in private life. Or is it that
governments are better motivated - e.g. rather than
focusing on short-run profits, they take a more 'far
sighted' point of view or, rather than looking at
private profits, they instead focus on the 'social
interest?' The first position is palpably false. The
United States government is now outcompeting
private borrowers in its desire to finance present
spending; and the pressures of electoral competition
and the fear of coups generate strong incentives for
Third World governments to generate present
benefits. (In many African nations, it should be noted,
the recurrent budget has displaced capital spending.)
The second position is indecisive. It turns on an
unresolved debate: whose version of the social interest
shall guide investment choices? The reference point for
government decision-making remains undermined
and the approach is therefore useless as a guide to
government behaviour.
Having given so much of the action to governments,
Bienefeld cannot convince us that they will in fact act
in the way they must if his position is to be persuasive.
Even more to the point, he lacks a theory of how they
will - as opposed to how they should - behave. His
position has no politics.
Should Governments Alter Market Allocation?
Point iii) follows from points i) and ii). As an
independent argument, it may or may not be valid. I
lack the time and space to address its independent
merits. But insofar as its validity derives from the
validity of its premises, it clearly is deeply tiawed.
Implications
Where, then, does this discussion lead? Clearly, both
for Bienefeld's position and my own, there is a need for
the study of domestic policy formation. Why do
governments get involved in their economies the way
they do? Why do they choose to intervene and what
determines the manner and pattern of their
interventions?
In analysing government behaviour, the discussion
suggests, we would do well to choose subjects which
avoid polarising the analysis between advocacy of the
market and defence of the public sector. Political
involvement is a fact of life; given that, it should be
analysed. One way of proceeding is by comparing and
contrasting the ways in which different governments
intervene in the same arenas; the passage from
description to explanation can then be achieved by
trying to account for the variations in their behaviour.
An example would be the study of patterns of market
intervention in agriculture. Another would be a
comparative study of marketing boards, noting the
way in which different boards regulate the production,
processing, and sale of different commodities. Such
studies would allow us to analyse governmental
behaviour and to advocate ways in which the conduct
of public agencies could be improved.
The discussion indicates that a second key set of
studies should focus on the variety of ways in which
governments accommodate international markets.
Why do some countries adopt 'outward oriented'
strategies while others attempt to shelter themselves
from foreign markets? Why do some countries adopt
overvalued currencies while others seek to maintain
'open market' valuations? What accounts for the
transition between different trade strategies? Are there
systematic differences between the coalitional basis
for different policy regimes? How is the transition
from one regime to another politically managed?
It should be noted that several critical subjects for
study fall into this last category. One would be the
study of commodity agreements: why do some
governments invest in the diplomacy necessary to
achieve these whereas others choose to remain as price
takers in international markets? Another would be the
politics of structural adjustment - of the domestic
and diplomatic dynamics which underlie political
relations with international capital markets. A third
would be the study of the political role of 'economic
technocrats'. How and under what circumstances do
they become politically influential? How and under
what circumstances do they achieve the power to
override 'spending ministries' and seize the power of
policy formation? What role do they play in leading
governments to adopt 'market conforming' policies?
There remains a last major topic - one also designed
to capitalise on the admixture of such divergent
positions as Bienefeld's and my own. Insofar as
governments seek to regulate markets, parallel
markets will form. The existence of government as an
actor in the marketplace surely conditions the nature
of private economic activity. In what ways does it do
so? And the existence of parallel, private markets
surely conditions the behaviour of public agencies and
alters the way in which policy instruments link to the
attainment of public objectives. In what ways does the
existence of parallel markets alter the behaviour and
strategies of public organisations? Much of Africa's
economic activity takes place in parallel markets. But
these markets remain unstudied through empirical
investigation and unanalysed through the application
of formal methods of economic reasoning. Their
analysis has not gone much further than arguing
whether private markets are a good thing or bad. More
important is the acquisition of knowledge. We need to
know their impact upon the nature of the private
economy (i.e. on the rise of 'African capitalism') and
their implication for the behaviour of public agencies
(i.e. on the development of the African state).
The 'public versus private' debate represents the least
interesting portion of political economy. It certainly is
among the least productive, and its continuation will
frustrate progress. Rather, we should be analysing the
origins of governmental involvement, the manner of
these involvements, and the nature of their impact.
Economists can no longer pretend there is no
government; nor can they leave it as a 'black box'; nor
can they fill in the black box by endowing
governments with the ability and intention to perform
the tasks which they believe must be performed to
secure development. Rather, given that governments
are major allocational agencies in their own right, and
that they influence as well the value of allocations
made outside of the public arena, economists should
take governments as objects of study and attempt
seriously to comprehend the determinants of their
behaviour.
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